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We analyze exchange rate volatility in the Visegrad Four countries in the course of their 
abandoning tight regimes for more flexible ones. We account for path dependence, 
asymmetric shocks, movements in interest rates, and allow for generalized error 
distribution. The overall findings are that volatility path dependence has a limited effect on 
exchange rate developments and introduction of floating regimes tends to increase exchange 
rate volatility. During the period of flexible regimes volatility was to a large extent driven 
by surprises. Degree of persistence in exchange rate volatility is high, differs with respect to 
currency, but stays at a similar level under the floating regime. Asymmetric news effect 
tends to decrease volatility under the float. Interest differential contemporaneously impacts 
exchange rate volatility under either regime, while the interest differential intertemporal 
effect is not found. Accordingly we draw policy implications. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
Exchange rate volatility has been the subject of a considerable amount of research related 
above all to foreign exchange markets and exchange rate arrangements.1 Since the work of 
Mussa (1986) it has become a stylized fact of international economics that exchange rate 
volatility under a flexible regime is greater than that under a fixed arrangement.2 Much 
debate has thus centered on the question of how to measure the volatility; over time the 
approach has shifted from the use of standard deviation towards the use of foreign exchange 
options and ARCH-type models.3 Exchange rate volatility and its measurement have taken 
on new importance in the context of the transition process in the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries and their integration into the European Union. 
Since the early years of transition, most of the advanced reformers in Central and 
Eastern Europe have developed independent, autonomous monetary policies. Concurrently, 
they have departed from fixed exchange rates by applying various “exit strategies” at 
different times and with different intensity, and have moved towards (a type of) inflation 
targeting as a policy instrument (Orlowski, 2001).4 In addition, economic integration 
brought increased international trade openness; it has been documented that exchange rate 
volatility weakens exports, this impact varying across sectors and across CEE countries 
(Égert and Morales-Zumaquero, 2005), and that a decrease in exchange rate volatility has a 
positive effect on demand shock convergence (Babetskii, 2005). Further, on the institutional 
level, exchange rate stability is defined as one of the Maastricht criteria for monetary 
integration5: as stressed and analyzed by Orlowski (2003), candidate countries for the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) accession need to demonstrate their capability to 
manage inflation and exchange rate risk premium as a necessary prerequisite for their 
successful monetary convergence. In short, diminishing exchange rate risk is suggested as a 
1 For classic work see Mussa (1986), Stockman (1988), and Papell (1992) among others. More details are 
given in Section 2. 
2 Kanas (2005) focuses on the period 1921-2002, which is characterized by different nominal exchange rate 
regimes and monetary regimes, and finds supporting evidence of the US/UK real exchange rate-real interest 
differential relation, in terms of volatility regime dependence. The two variables are jointly characterized by 
high volatility during periods of floating exchange rates, and by low volatility during periods of fixed 
exchange rates, thereby suggesting that the nominal exchange rate regime is the driving force behind the 
volatility regime switching. 
3 For example, Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) use standard deviation, Figlewski (1997) provides an 
overview of estimating volatility from option prices, and Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) use 
ARCH-type proxy of exchange rate volatility. 
4 All this happened relatively swiftly, often during turbulent economic developments and conflicting monetary 
policies, and undoubtedly affected exchange rate volatility. 
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key criterion for evaluating currency stability and thus effectiveness of monetary 
convergence to the euro (Orlowski, 2004). 
In this paper we analyze exchange rate volatility in the Visegrad Four countries in 
the course of their abandoning tight regimes in favor of more flexible ones.6 In analyzing 
exchange rate volatility we account for path dependence, asymmetric shocks, and 
movements in interest rates. We find that (1) volatility path dependence has a limited effect 
on exchange rate developments, (2) introduction of floating regimes tends to increase 
exchange rate volatility, a finding that is broadly in line with the above stylized fact, (3) 
during the period of flexible regimes volatility was to a large extent driven by surprises, (4) 
degree of persistence in exchange rate volatility differs with respect to currency but stays at 
a similar level under the floating regime, (5) asymmetric news effect tends to decrease 
volatility under the float, and (6) interest rate influences exchange rate volatility in less than 
obvious ways: under both regimes the contemporaneous effect of interest differential 
impacts exchange rate volatility, while the interest differential intertemporal effect cannot 
be assessed due to insignificant coefficients. In our approach we aim to contribute to the 
empirical as well as methodological debate on exchange rate volatility with an accent on the 
comparative context of the selected new member states in the process of European 
integration. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an account of exchange 
rate developments as well as their arrangements in the Visegrad Four countries. Section 3 
discusses exchange rate volatility and sources of this volatility, which are specific to the 
process of transition. Section 4 describes the methodology to measure volatility while 
Section 5 gives details about the data and changes in exchange rate regime. In Section 6 we 
present our results. We conclude with comments and policy implications. 
 
2. Exchange rates and their arrangements in Central Europe 
 
5 The Maastricht criteria require that the country’s currency should have participated without stress in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) for at least two years prior to being allowed to adopt the euro. 
6 Visegrad Four members are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. As early as December 
1991, the former Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary signed the “European Agreement” with the European 
Union. These countries have striven to establish a workable framework for international trade and cooperation 
in order to facilitate the transition process. Their effort was institutionalized in March 1993 in the form of the 
Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA); apart from the Visegrad Four, the agreement was later 
signed by Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. On a broader scale the four countries established a framework for 
political cooperation by signing the Visegrad agreement. In 1995-6 these countries applied for EU 
membership and in 2004 became its members. 
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In Central Europe the institutional design of exchange rate regimes has varied across 
countries since the beginning of transition.7 Yet even though the regimes adopted were 
quite heterogeneous, we can still observe certain evolutionary similarities; but in no respect 
do we claim the Visegrad Four to be a homogenous group. The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia all adopted fixed exchange rates at the beginning of transition. The 
Czech and Slovak Republics, which until January 1, 1993 formed a federation and which 
shared a uniform exchange rate policy, fixed their currencies to a currency basket. At the 
beginning of transition this basket consisted of five different currencies, and later on of the 
US dollar and Deutsch mark. The weights of each currency in the basket were determined 
by the importance of that particular currency to the foreign trade of the country. The width 
of the band was set at ±0.5% from central parity. After their separation in 1993, Slovakia 
changed its band to ±7% and later the Czech Republic changed it to ±7.5%. Central banks 
were obliged to intervene in the currency market to sustain the basket peg. 
A similar institutional arrangement evolved in Poland and Hungary. The only 
difference is that these two countries adopted a pre-announced crawling peg to the basket of 
currencies.8 The central parity was not constant, as it was in the case of the Czech Republic 
or Slovakia, but was changed each month; the periodic devaluations were announced ahead 
of time. In some cases the width of the band was changed during the period as well. The 
intricacy of such institutional design is clear from Table 1, which displays in extensive 
detail all the adjustments that the central banks of the four CEE countries adopted in 
exchange rate management. The abundance of these adjustments is apparent in the cases of 
Poland and Hungary. In this context Orlowski (2000a) investigated how various approaches 
to monetary policy in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic influenced the trend and the 
stability of (real) exchange rates during 1995-1999, and casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
crawling devaluations. 
After the late spring turmoil in financial markets, in May 1997 the Czech Republic 
was the first Central European country to adopt a floating exchange rate regime. In October 
1998, the National Bank of Slovakia followed suit. Later, Poland (in 2000) and Hungary 
7 See Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2001) for a comprehensive overview. Égert (2003) provides a critical 
survey of the literature on equilibrium exchange rates in the CEE accession countries. The scope of the paper 
covers the behavior of exchange rates under various regimes as well. 
8 Szapary and Jakab (1998) review Hungary's experience with the pre-announced crawling band exchange rate 
system during 1995-97. Kemme and Teng (2000) provide a comprehensive analysis of the exchange rate 
policies in Poland and their effect on export growth. 
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(“quasi” in 2001) also left the fixed regime to adopt a floating regime. We therefore see a 
general tendency to move from a tight exchange regime to a looser one (Kočenda, 2002; 
Bofinger and Wollmershäuser, 2001). Yet when these exits from rigid exchange regimes are 
compared, the movements of Poland and Hungary towards relaxed regimes seem rather 
“orderly” in contrast with the “disorderly” exits in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Detragiache, Mody and Okada (2005) claim that “disorderly” exit strategies take place 
when there are problems with real appreciation, falling reserves, a deteriorating fiscal 
position, and financial outflows (due to low interest rate differential); “orderly” exits 
happen when the above macroeconomic problem are absent.9 The "disorderly" exits of the 
Czech and Slovak Republics can thus be explained, at least in good part, by the financial 
crisis and pre-election turmoil, respectively. 
Apart from a shift toward looser exchange rate regimes, the Visegrad Four countries 
share another similarity, that inflation targeting was adopted, albeit in various forms. The 
widely implemented form of direct inflation targeting (DIT) as defined, among others, by 
Svensson (1999) and Orlowski (2000b), “is a policy framework that is based on a pre-
announced inflation target, on transparent strategies and tactics leading to its 
accomplishment, and on the policy implementation responding to periodic deviations 
between inflation forecasts and the inflation target” (see Orlowski, 2001 for a 
comprehensive account). 
All four countries formally applied for EU membership in 1995-6 and underwent a 
lengthy and thorough screening process. On May 1, 2004 they joined the EU, which means 
that at some point they will become part of the EMU (or Euro zone) since no opt-out clause 
was permitted for ten of the recently admitted countries. Although EU membership alone 
does not mean immediate participation in the Euro zone, membership nevertheless increases 
pressure on the new member countries to improve their institutions and maintain stable 
economic environments, and hence should foster euro-conversion-oriented development of 
their exchange rates.10 The operations and timing of euro conversion is an intricate task; in 
this respect Slovakia is a forerunner as it entered the ERM II regime on November 27, 2005.  
9 Kočenda (2005) documents the existence of several key problems inherent to “disorderly” exits in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia prior to relaxation of exchange rate regimes. 
10 A looser exchange regime with the Euro as a reference currency should be considered the pursuit of a 
credible peg for a domestic currency with respect to the Euro that allows for necessary responses to the 
market. Indeed, if a currency fluctuates within a ±15% band with respect to the Euro, then it implicitly follows 
the ERM II condition even if the country does not participate formally. 
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3. Exchange rate volatility: transition stages and sources 
3.1 Classic empirics 
Exchange rate volatility in the context of nominal exchange rate regime neutrality in 
equilibrium models was initially investigated by Mussa (1986), who derived a clear 
conclusion that has since become a stylized fact in international monetary economics: the 
variability of real exchange rate is greater under a flexible nominal exchange rate regime 
than under a fixed arrangement. Based on his analysis, Mussa concluded that the choice of 
exchange regime has real effects and contradicts those monetary models that assume 
nominal exchange rate regime neutrality. Real effect is attributed to sluggishness in prices 
because, while variance of nominal exchange rate increases substantially under the flexible 
regime, the variance of relative national price levels changes only a little. 
Stockman (1988) endorsed Mussa’s findings, though he suggested a different 
explanation. Instead of “sluggish prices”, Stockman designed an intertemporal equilibrium 
model and within this framework argued that real disturbances to supplies and demands for 
goods were the factors that alter the real exchange rate.11 Modification of his model to 
accommodate flexible prices yields the same result of different variability in exchange rate 
when changing the regime to greater flexibility. Empirical testing of Stockman's (1988) 
theory was completed by Papell (1992) on data from the EMS. He argues that it matters 
how exchange rate variability is defined, and his findings show that if variability is defined 
as the standard deviation of first differences (as in Mussa, 1986), then change to a flexible 
regime has a substantial downward effect on real exchange rate variability. However, if the 
standard deviation of linearly detrended data is used as a volatility measure, then change in 
regime has no effect on real exchange rate volatility. 
 
 
Orlowski (2001) proposes a sequence of steps towards monetary convergence to the Euro zone based on 
autonomous monetary policy rather than on an early application of the euro-peg, and warns against a 
premature peg to the euro, which may instigate real currency appreciation, large capital inflows, and their 
costly sterilization. 
11 Under a flexible nominal exchange rate regime a disturbance that depreciates the real exchange rate would 
be followed by depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Under a fixed regime, though, a central bank must 
intervene to support its currency. Such an intervention would cause a change in nominal money and prices 
coupled with a loss of international reserves. History shows that countries try to prevent the outflow of 
reserves and possible balance-of-payment crises by imposing various trade restrictions and exchange and 
capital controls. Stockman (1988) argues that expectations of such policies, adopted in the case of falling 
reserves, would, with some intertemporal substitution, tend to increase current relative prices through an 
increase in expected prices, and thus tend to stabilize the real exchange rate. 
5
 3.2 Effects of transition process and sources of volatility 
Without a doubt, progress in the transition process has to be taken into account when 
analyzing exchange rate volatility and its sources. In the early stages of transition, the 
Visegrad Four countries experienced nearly everything that could be characterized as 
turbulent times and that would tend to increase exchange rate risk: monetary separation 
(Czech and Slovak Republics), banking crises, financial crises, and political crises. We 
present several of the most important sources of volatility specific to the Visegrad Four 
countries in order to provide a brief outline of the systemic and institutional foundations of 
exchange rate risk. In Section 6 with empirical results we then further elaborate on the 
extent to which progress in transition has been reflected in our findings. 
Quite naturally, volatility has stemmed from the exchange rate arrangements and 
their modifications as described in detail in Section 2. Even so, differences in exchange rate 
regimes are not an exclusive source of this volatility, as many other factors exist. 
Specifically, it is important to recognize that exchange rate risk has been rising in the 
Visegrad Four countries and that a major underlying reason for this is their questionable 
outlook for fiscal discipline. These countries are also susceptible to the contagion effects of 
international financial crises, which tend to increase exchange rate volatility (Orlowski, 
2003). Moreover, prior to 2004 the Visegrad Four countries were EU candidates and thus 
subject to the same pressure on fiscal discipline as they are now, being full members and 
effectively having entered the path towards monetary integration. 
Above all, the impact of the overall monetary policy framework on exchange rate 
volatility plays an important role. After giving up currency pegs, the Visegrad Four 
countries adopted policies based on direct inflation targeting (DIT) and gave up an 
exchange rate stability target by focusing more or less exclusively on inflation targets. 
Nominal exchange rates are likely to exhibit increasing volatility for at least two reasons. 
First, regime switching from currency pegs to flexible exchange rates, and as a result of 
adopting DIT policies that, at least in the case of Poland and to a lesser degree in the Czech 
Republic, has been accompanied by a benign neglect of exchange rate stability (Orlowski, 
2005). Second, during those periods of faster money growth, the pressure on domestic 
inflation had been rising and contributed to exchange rate volatility as well; Hungary and 
Poland serve as examples. Without a doubt, a converging economy ought to give priority to 
the objective of lowering inflation, before placing emphasis on exchange rate stability. This 
is so because price stability or low inflation is a prerequisite for exchange rate stability, not 
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the other way around, as is underscored by the causal effects described in the empirical 
literature (Orlowski, 2004). 
Another source of exchange rate volatility is increasing openness of an economy.12 
In this respect, trade integration in the Visegrad Four countries is of particular importance. 
Shortly after the start of the transition process these countries re-directed their foreign trade 
from the former Soviet bloc towards the EU. Over the years, foreign trade turnover has 
increased dramatically such that now the ratio of foreign trade turnover to GDP has reached 
values of around 80% for Poland to almost 150% for Slovakia. A reverse link is 
documented by Égert and Morales-Zumaquero (2005), who analyzed the direct impact of 
exchange rate volatility on the export performance of ten Central and Eastern European 
transition economies as well as its indirect impact via changes in exchange rate regimes. 
Their results suggest that the size and direction of the impact of foreign exchange volatility 
and of regime changes on exports is negative, varies considerably across sectors and 
countries, and may be connected to specific periods. In the context of our analysis a high 
degree of openness is common for all countries in question and, therefore, should contribute 
to the evolution of volatility of exchange rates in a similar way. 
Less clear-cut are those impacts of the transition process that materialize through 
institutional procedures connected with exchange rate management in a broad sense. 
Institutional setup is often related to exchange rate risk only indirectly since it reaches 
beyond an exchange rate arrangement. It involves, among other things, the degree of 
credibility, the independence of the monetary authority, the existence of targeting 
mechanisms (inflation, monetary aggregates), and, for the Visegrad Four countries, the 
process of EU accession, and eventually ERM II and Euro zone membership, with the same 
sort of expectation effects as observed in the past ERMII-to-Euro zone changeover. The 
effects of these factors on exchange rates are covered in great detail in Vinhas de Souza 
(2002). He finds that, for a sample of accession countries, a credible, independent central 
bank with a floating exchange rate and a targeting mechanism mimics the nominal 
variability (including exchange rate) properties of a truly fixed exchange rate regime. This 
12 Hau (2002) analyzed the link between openness of an economy and real exchange rate movements in 48 
countries and found that trade integration and real exchange rate volatility were structurally linked and that 
there is a negative correlation between them. 
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result supports the hypothesis that the volatility of exchange rate is also affected by other 
institutional factors, not only by the exchange rate regime.13
More specific sources of exchange rate volatility and their developments are also 
observed with respect to tighter versus looser exchange regimes. During the prevailing 
period when versions of the currency basket peg were used among the Visegrad Four 
countries, their banking sector was less developed than that of European market economies. 
As privatization of large state owned banks progressed, as did expansion of new 
commercial banks from abroad, the degree of competitiveness in the banking sector started 
to increase.14 Although we cannot seamlessly connect the switch of exchange regimes to 
banking sector improvements, we nevertheless see that during the period of the float the 
financial system became more developed and less susceptible. That is, it became better able 
to accommodate a wide range of shocks and better fit to cope with volatility at the same 
time. Commercial banks, too, after being fully privatized, started to engage more heavily in 
transactions with foreign exchange; the volumes traded surpassed several times those from 
earlier stages of transition. 
A further source of volatility relates to the countries' balance of payments. Early in 
transition (that is, under the basket peg regimes) the Visegrad Four began to experience 
increases in their current account deficits. By using adjustable versions of basket pegs, 
Poland and Hungary avoided large real exchange rate appreciation; the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, on the other hand, experienced real appreciation of their currencies, which made 
managing their current accounts harder but which made it easier for current account 
volatility to spill over to exchange rate volatility. In the Czech Republic, the mounting 
current account deficit along with financial crisis increased exchange volatility considerably 
and had a direct impact on the stance of the central bank towards exchange rate 
management. All four countries began to liberalize their capital accounts as part of their 
macroeconomic stabilization packages, but full scale liberalization became a reality only 
several years later. Such liberalization increased capital account volatility. The deteriorating 
risk structure of capital inflows towards short-term money further increased the capital 
13 We would like to thank Lucio Vinhas de Souza for pointing out this issue. But as we mentioned earlier on 
the credibility issue, we chose those CEE countries whose institutional setups evolved similarly over the last 
10 years. This entails not only a common change from fixed to floating exchange rate regime, but also a 
similar (or same) quality of monetary authorities, transition experience, timing of EU accession process, EU 
entry, and expected date of Euro zone membership. 
14 This was documented for example by continuously decreasing interest rate spreads (Kočenda, 2001; Kutan 
and Yigit, 2004). 
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account volatility that naturally spilled over to exchange rates. Calmer times came with 
increased proportions of foreign direct investments, which improved the risk structure of the 
capital account and lowered its volatility. During the later stages of transition, and under the 
float regimes, capital account volatility figured less significantly in exchange volatility. For 
the prospective Euro zone entrants, it is imperative to devise a robust monetary policy 
framework that will shield their economies from the disruptive effects of capital account 




4.1 Theoretical framework to measure volatility 
Many earlier empirical studies based their results on reporting standard deviation as a proxy 
for exchange rate volatility (see Hallett and Anthony, 1997; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998; 
Jorion, 1995; Scott and Tucker, 1989 among others). We believe that such an approach is 
overly simplistic from both a methodological as well as a theoretical perspective. Using 
standard deviation as a proxy for the volatility of exchange rates assumes constant average 
daily returns – yet such an assumption is directly violated under the interest rate parity 
condition, which is one of the workhorses employed in the analysis of exchange rates. 
Simply speaking, by using standard deviation as an exchange rate volatility proxy one can 
detect spurious volatility, which is caused by movements in exchange rates that are 
generated via interest rate differential. Thus, neglecting movements in interest rates can 
result in less reliable results. 
For that reason we approach the volatility issue in the spirit of the excess volatility 
debate, i.e. we address whether and to what extent the volatility of exchange rates exceeds 
the volatility of underlying fundamentals (interest rates in our case).15 To approximate an 
otherwise unobservable volatility we follow one of the approaches suggested by Andersen, 
Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2001).16 We aim to fit a parametric econometric model of 
the ARCH-type (due to Engle, 1982) augmented by appropriate parameters to account for 
15 We thank an anonymous referee for this pointing this out. 
16 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2001) list three ways to approximate an otherwise unobservable 
volatility: by (a) fitting parametric econometric models such as generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH); b) calculating direct indicators of volatility such as ex post squared or absolute 
returns; or (c) calculating volatility implied by option prices. In addition, the authors propose a new volatility 
measure which they call “realized volatility”. It is computed by summing intraday squared returns, and by this 
definition it is limited to data with intraday frequency. 
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the effect of interest rate differential on the volatility of exchange rates. To augment our 
ARCH-type model, which is specified in the next section, we build on the concept of 
uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). This approach conveniently connects exchange rate 
and interest rate movements and allows us also to distinguish the effect of interest rates on 
exchange rate volatility. 
From the methodological point of view the use of UIP for exchange rate modeling in 
the transition context is not uncommon. It stems from Svensson's (2000) modeling strategy 
for a small open economy and was utilized in the transition context by Golinelli and Rovelli 
(2002) to analyze monetary policy rules. Such an approach makes sense since, on a 
practical level, the Visegrad Four countries early in their transition swiftly liberalized their 
capital accounts and further eased remaining barriers to financial transactions. 
Consequently, over time, there has been an increasing extent of capital mobility, whose 
relatively high degree has created a working ground for the UIP, together with the fact that 
political risk has been decreasing in these countries as well.17
Empirical support for UIP among the Visegrad Four countries is evidenced by 
Golinelli and Rovelli (2005), who adopted the UIP hypothesis for estimating exchange rates 
in order to account for the process of disinflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. They show that the current exchange rate depends on the current interest rate 
differential and on the expected future exchange rate, augmented by a risk premium. In 
addition, Chinn (2006) documents reasonable support for UIP in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, as well as in other emerging markets. Further empirical support is given by 
Orlowski (2004), who proposes a model linking exchange rate volatility to differentials 
across the Euro zone in both inflation (target variable) and interest rate (instrument 
variable). Through a VAR framework he shows that an increase in domestic interest rates 
relative to German rates contributes to currency appreciation in the case of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, while the results for Poland are inconclusive. Thus, changes in the 
value of the Polish currency relative to the euro show a considerably weaker response to 
interest rate differentials than the relative changes in the currencies of the two remaining 
countries (Czech Republic and Hungary).18
17 Chinn (2006) puts forward capital account controls and political risk as two main obstacles precluding   the 
UIP from holding in emerging markets. 
18 This is not a surprise, since the NBP remains fervently committed to a fully flexible exchange rate system, 
while the CNB follows a managed float strategy and the NBH has applied an ERM II shadowing regime since 
October 2001 (Orlowski, 2004). 
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The conventional notion of interest rate parity can be expressed as 
         (1) *1 tttt iiss −=−+
where st denotes the natural logarithm of an exchange rate at time t; it and it* are the 
domestic and foreign interest rates of equal maturity. For the UIP, st+1 would mean an 
expected exchange rate one period ahead, while for covered interest rate parity, st+1 would 
mean a forward rate for one period ahead but known at time t. Thus, equation (1) is a usual 
expression that an intertemporal change in exchange rate, under this theoretical condition, 
equals the interest rate differential.19
Under the UIP condition, in every period the exchange rate should make an 
adjustment in the form of a change that is equal to the size of the interest rate differential. In 
contrast to the theoretical equality above, in reality an exchange rate is likely to show short 
run deviations from the UIP and such deviations may reasonably be related to the size of the 
interest rate differential. This creates room for such deviations to factor into exchange rate 
volatility, and corresponding movements in interest rates are likely to affect the volatility of 
exchange rate. Although the effect of movements in interest rates is unclear, some 
theoretical ground for this is given by Bilson (1999), who shows that volatility of exchange 
rate is related to the difference between the interest rates of the two currencies. To account 
for nonlinearity in such a link, an ARCH-type model should be augmented by the squared 
interest rate differential ( )*tt ii −
2. Yet such a parameter alone might not be sufficient since it 
would capture the contemporaneous effect of the differential but not its dynamics. To 
remedy that, we opt for the second parameter in the form of an intertemporal change in 
interest rate differential squared ( ))( *tt ii −∆
2. 
 
4.2. Augmented TGARCH-M approximated volatility 
In empirical testing of exchange rate volatility we employ an augmented threshold 
GARCH-in-mean (TGARCH-M) model. Such specification has important extensions to the 
simple version of the GARCH model (due to Bollerslev, 1986) where volatility (conditional 
variance ) is modelled as a function of the past squared innovations as well as its own 2tσ
19 It is possible to separate the interest rate differential into two variables—domestic and foreign interest rate. 
By separating them we would allow domestic and foreign interest rates to have different impacts on the 
exchange rate. This approach can be found in Svensson (1993) or Rose and Svensson (1994). We decide to 
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past variance. First, the M-extension includes a conditional variance in the mean equation; 
this enables us to analyze the process with the path dependent rather than zero conditional 
mean. Second, the threshold extension accounts for asymmetric information.20 Inclusion of 
a leverage dummy, dt, enables us to make a distinction between positive and negative 
shocks to volatility or for innovations to have an asymmetric effect on conditional volatility. 
Third, we augment the variance specification by the two parameters (interest rate 
differential and its intertemporal change) in order to isolate the effect of movements in 
interest rates on exchange rate volatility. 











































where ∆st is the difference of the log of exchange rate between time t and t-1 (exchange rate 
change over two consecutive trading days), and k is the number of lags chosen by Schwarz-
Bayesian lag selection criterion, as is the number of lags p and q; the log of conditional 
variance in mean equation ( ) allows for an exponential rather than quadratic effect of 
observed volatility. The leverage effect dummy variable (TARCH term) d
2ln tσ
t-1 is equal to 1 if 
εt-1<0 (negative shock or good news) and 0 otherwise (positive shocks or bad news)21; 
( ) and ( ) are the annualized interest rate differential and the change in 
interest rate differential, respectively. The shock dummy (SD
*
tt ii − )(
*
tt ii −∆
t) in the mean equation 
accounts for a few infrequent outliers of currencies’ appreciation and depreciation 
movements and is described in detail in Section 5. 
 
use the differential under the assumption that a change in domestic and foreign interest rate would have the 
same impact on the exchange rate and that only the level of interest rate differential plays an important role. 
20 The GARCH specification implies a symmetric impact of innovations on volatility. Whether innovation εt is 
positive or negative makes no difference on the expected variance in the ensuing period. Only the size of the 
innovation matters—simply speaking it means that good news and bad news have the same effect. For 
example, the theory of leverage effect, first described in Black (1976) in connection with the stock market, 
suggests that positive and negative innovations have a different impact. Hence a large unanticipated drop in 
the market is expected to lead to higher volatility than a large unanticipated increase of comparable 
magnitude. 
21 The specification of volatility with leverage effect (represented by dummy variable dt-1) was introduced by 
Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) and applied to exchange rates in the transition context by Kočenda 
(1998) and Orlowski (2003). In the case of the exchange rate, the leverage effect represents the fact that a 
decrease in the price of a foreign currency in terms of a domestic currency, or a domestic currency’s 
appreciation, would tend to increase the subsequent volatility of the domestic currency more than would a 
depreciation of equal magnitude. 
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 In the above specification ARCH term  reflects the impact of ‘news’ or 
‘surprises’ from previous periods that affect exchange rate volatility: significant, positive 
and less than one α depicts the extent of shocks that do not destabilize volatility. When α is 
greater than one then shocks materializing in the past are destabilizing.
2
1−tαε
22 GARCH term 
, on the other hand, measures the impact of the forecast variance from previous 
periods on the current conditional variance, or volatility. Significant coefficient β (close to 
one) thus means a high degree of persistence in exchange rate volatility. The sum of both 
coefficients (α and β) indicates the speed of convergence of the forecast of the conditional 
volatility to a steady state: the closer to one its value is, the slower the convergence. 
TARCH asymmetric term  measures and accounts for the effect of the difference 
between good and bad news. The value of statistically significant leverage coefficient ξ 
indicates the magnitude of the leverage effect, and the sign its direction. A positive value of 
coefficient ξ indicates an increase—and a negative coefficient a decrease—in subsequent 
volatility of the exchange rate. Further, a negative value of the estimated coefficient means 
that negative shocks tend to raise subsequent volatility of exchange rate more than positive 




11 −− ttd εξ
1 and δ2 capture the 
contemporaneous and intertemporal effects of the interest rate differential on exchange rate 
volatility. It is expected that the smaller the size of the interest rate differential, the smaller 
should be its effect on subsequent volatility. 
Based on the information criteria (AIC and SIC) and significance of coefficients, we 
select a specific version of the baseline model (2) that best corresponds to data on each 
currency and regime, and report the results. Standardized residuals from such a 
specification are free from ARCH effects. Estimation of the model is performed by using a 





L σεπσ  as in Bollerslev 
(1986). The maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by using the numerical 
optimization algorithm described by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). In order to 
avoid the risk of overestimating volatility we do not impose the i.i.d. normal distribution 
condition as is the case in many earlier studies. Rather, we allow for the generalized error 
distribution (GED) of Nelson (1991). The reason is that the exchange rate volatility series is 
very likely to follow a leptokurtic data distribution (as reflected by the actual GED 
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parameter considerably lower than 2, which is the value in the case of normal distribution). 
Empirical results presented in Section 6 show that this is a valid assumption. Leptokurtosis 
of daily exchange rate volatility implies that it tends to concentrate around the mean during 
tranquil market periods, while the shocks to volatility are very large during turbulent 
times.23
 
5. Data and Regime Switch 
We use daily nominal exchange rates expressed in terms of the euro24 to calculate changes 
in exchange rate over two consecutive periods in the currencies of the Visegrad Four.25 The 
interest rates of the Bundesbank and later of the European Central Bank (ECB) are used as a 
"foreign interest rate." We use daily interest rates of one-month maturity to calculate the 
needed interest rate differentials. In the literature we may also find shorter maturities used, 
but the one-month maturity is the maturity published in each country for the longest period. 
It is also close to a standard reference interest rate for most central banks. All data were 
assembled from statistics provided by the central banks of the countries under research for 
considerable periods before and after the regime was changed. In case of Slovakia we have 
gathered interest rate data (July-October 1997) from the ECOWIN Database since it was not 
readily available from the central bank. Length of the data varies depending on the extent of 
the particular regime; details on time span are given in Table 2.1. 
Aside from similar developments in loosening their exchange rate regimes, our 
choice of the Visegrad Four countries reflects another factor that could influence exchange 
rate volatility, namely the credibility of the arrangement. In a spirit of the theoretical model 
of Krugman (1991), widening the fluctuation band should lead to an increase in the 
credibility of the band and consequently to a lowering in the volatility of the exchange rate. 
 
22 This condition is sufficient but not necessary. For a destabilizing effect we only need α + β ≥ 1, which is 
less strict. 
23 See Orlowski and Rybinski (2006) for a similar approach. 
24 In 1999 a common European currency, the Euro, replaced the national currencies of those countries that 
became members of the EMU.The euro started to serve in 1999 for banking or essentially non-cash 
transactions, and since 2002 for all transactions, including those made in cash. For the sake of consistency we 
use the official fixed parity (1 Euro = 1.95583 Deutsch mark) to recalculate exchange rates for the pre-1999 
period.  
25 We concentrate on the Visegrad Four group for practical reasons inherent to our analysis of volatility under 
different exchange rate regimes. Among post-transition accession countries, the Baltic countries have been 
maintaining fixed-type regimes for a long time without any reasonably long period of floating exchange rate 
regime. Slovenia has maintained a floating exchange rate regime de iure and a tightly managed crawling band 
regime de facto and, from the econometric point of view, we cannot use the short period of fixed-type 
exchange rate regime of this country’s early transition. 
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However, the credibility could be influenced by factors other than the width of the 
fluctuation band -- interest rate differential, inflation rate differential, or the level of foreign 
reserves, for example. The Visegrad Four show a high level of credibility; they either did 
not change the central parity or were doing so in pre-announced steps. By including 
countries that were forced to unexpectedly re-align their central parity many times, we 
would face the problem of how to include a credibility variable in our model. The careful 
choice of countries with similar credibility should diminish the effect of credibility on 
exchange rate in our analysis. 
Since we want to analyze exchange rate volatility in conjunction with a move from a 
tighter to a looser exchange rate regime, the date of such a changeover seems to be the 
correct break point. However, the timing of the switch ought to be consistent with the 
departure from exchange rate-based monetary policies and not with the formal adoption of a 
pure float. For this reason we have to scrutinize each currency for an accurate date. This 
approach leads to a relatively uncomplicated choice for the Czech and Slovak currencies. 
After substantial periods of a currency basket peg the national banks introduced a floating 
regime on the following dates: May 26, 1997 in the Czech Republic and October 2, 1998 in 
Slovakia. 
In the case of Poland the answer is less clearcut. The National Bank of Poland 
(NBP) had effectively already abandoned the exchange rate-based monetary policy in May 
1995, long before switching to a pure float in April 12, 2000. The NBP had enacted in 1995 
a crawling devaluation regime with a wide band of permitted fluctuations that was later 
expanded to ±15%. Such a wide band allowed the NBP to refrain from large foreign 
exchange market interventions, as it was capable of absorbing all nominal shocks, 
particularly those stemming from the Asian and Russian financial crises. After adopting a 
direct inflation targeting strategy in January 1999, the NBP gave up foreign exchange 
interventions almost entirely and further loosened its exchange rate policy when it 
introduced a wide fluctuation band of ± 15.0% on March 25, 1999. Therefore, we chose 
January 7, 1999 since it is a more appropriate choice for regime switching in Poland than is 
April 12, 2000 when the float was formally introduced.26
The National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has followed an ERM II shadowing strategy 
and adopted the forint/euro reference rate on January 1, 2000. The band was widened from 
26 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for clarifying this issue. 
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 ±2.25% to ± 15.0% on May 4, 2001 and NBH adopted inflation targeting at this time. 
Although the crawling peg was abandoned only in October 2001, when the rate of crawl 
was set to zero, the rate of crawl was very low. As a matter of fact, the daily devaluation of 
the central parity amounted to 0.00654%, which resulted in a total devaluation of 1.12% 
between May and October 2001 (Crespo-Cuaresma, Égert, and MacDonald, 2005). The 
overall impact of the crawl has been negligible and May 4, 2001 can be considered the 
effective date of exchange rate regime switch for the purpose of our analysis. 
A change in exchange rate regime (or an important modification) represents a 
certain shock for the currency markets. Traders and central banks during the time before 
and shortly after the change react differently than during a “normal” period. During this 
period of change the exchange rate series have different statistical properties and contain 
many outliers—observations that do not come from the usual data-generating process. 
Therefore, we exclude from our dataset data for one month before the change of regime and 
one month after. Thus, our results should not contain any bias born of turbulent times. The 
basic statistics for exchange rate changes are found in Table 2.1 and for interest rates in 
Table 2.2. 
Further, data for each country (and regime) include several observations that are 
clearly outside the normal data-generating process. These outliers usually correspond to a 
truly sudden change in a variable, or to other factors such as release of an unexpected 
macroeconomic indicator or short-term political turmoil (e.g. resignation of a minister). A 
standard GARCH model computes the next period's variance by squaring this period's 
shock. For very large shocks this approach produces dramatic increases in variance and 
distortion of coefficients. Friedman and Laibson (1989) argue that large shocks constitute 
extraordinary events and hence propose truncating their influence on the conditional 
variance. Charles and Darné (2005) make a case that the presence of outliers may have 
undesirable effects on the estimates of those equation parameters governing the volatility 
dynamics. We account for these extreme events by including a (shock) dummy variable 
(SDt) into the mean equation, rather than truncating the data. Using the classification of 
Hotta and Tsay (1998), this type of dummy accounts for additive outliers that only affect the 
level but leave the variance unaffected. In other words, these outliers do not influence the 
lagged disturbances that enter the conditional variance and, therefore, the variance equation 
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remains free from any outliers that would affect the coefficients values.27 The shock 
dummy bears a value of one when the size of daily change in exchange rate is higher than 
five times the standard deviation of the sample and zero otherwise. The number of such 
shocks is extremely small and ranges from 2 to 6. The exception is Hungarian forint under 
the float, where we find shocks to be present more often than in other countries and where 
we account for observations higher than two times the standard deviation. It is clear that the 
outliers we account for are quite infrequent when compared to the sample sizes of data used. 
Table 3 presents the facts on outliers in condensed form. 
 
6. Empirical findings 
Empirical results of the estimated volatility are presented in Tables 4-7. We first comment 
on results for each currency and then provide a brief summary. As a complement to the 
numerical outcomes we also provide graphical representation in Figures 1-4, where we plot 
conditional variance for all four currencies. The time-varying path of volatility delivers 
numerous insights on the responses of exchange rate risk to diverse general as well as 
specific external shocks. In general, under the fixed regime volatility is lower. Despite this, 
however, there are visible outbursts of volatility under both fixed and float regime periods. 
The Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in August 1998 and the Brazilian crisis in 
January 1999 provoked large shifts in the foreign exchanges and can be traced rather 
uniformly for all currencies. 
 
6.1 Volatility in Visegrad 
Table 4 contains results for the Czech Republic. A small, negative and significant 
coefficient of the (log of) conditional variance in the mean equation implies that exchange 
rate returns depended on the prevalent exchange rate risk under the tight regime. The 
negative coefficient means that an increase in volatility contributed to the currency's 
appreciation in terms of the euro but that such an effect was fairly limited. No effect of the 
volatility in the mean is found under the floating regime (coefficient not reported), which is 
positive news since volatility containment is therefore not a burning issue under the current 
regime. The estimated conditional variance equation shows that exchange rate risk is quite 
persistent under the tight regime, since the GARCH term coefficient is close to unity 
27 For other approaches to outlier detection see, for example, Doornik and Ooms (2005) in GARCH models 
and Giordani, Kohn and van Dijk (2006) or Battaglia and Orfei (2005) in general nonlinear time series 
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(0.9307). The degree of persistence (0.8910) declines under the float in some way, though. 
Further, unanticipated “news” or “surprises” about volatility tend to increase the exchange 
rate risk at about an equal degree under both regimes as documented by ARCH term 
coefficients (0.0612, 0.0672). The sum of ARCH and GARCH coefficients is very close to 
unity under the tight regime (0.9919) and declines somewhat under the float (09582). Thus 
we argue that the exchange rate risk of the Czech koruna is converging to a steady state but 
very slowly indeed. Asymmetric shocks seem not to affect the currency’s volatility since 
TARCH term coefficients are insignificant under both regimes. On the other hand, the 
impact of interest rate differential on volatility is evidenced under both regimes; regardless 
of the fact that the effect is fairly small, it nevertheless increases about four times under the 
float (0.0002 vs. 0.0009). Intertemporal change in interest differential does not affect 
exchange volatility whatsoever (coefficient not reported). 
Aside from the uniform reasons for increases in volatility mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, there are more specific reasons related to each currency. Figure 1 
shows conditional volatility developments in the Czech Republic. The effect of the Asian 
crisis was coupled with a local financial crisis that erupted on May 26, 1997. The mounting 
current account deficit and massive outflow of short-term capital prompted the Czech 
National bank (CNB) to relax the exchange regime towards the float since it was not willing 
to waste foreign exchange reserves on futile interventions. A subsequent credit crunch on 
the side of commercial banks was a major factor as well. The political crisis in 1998, when 
the government was recalled by the President for the first time in the history of the country 
(since 1918), and early elections in 1999 also affected volatility considerably. Such 
heightened volatility vanished only slowly, as is visible on the graph. A further increase in 
volatility in 2002, which continued into 2003, is most likely associated with significant 
deterioration in Czech fiscal discipline during this period. 
The results for Slovakia are presented in Table 5 and yield rather different results 
from those detected in the case of the Czech Republic. An absence of significant 
coefficients of the conditional variance in the mean equation (not reported) implies that 
exchange rate returns are not greatly affected by the prevalent exchange rate risk under 
either regime. Exchange rate volatility has thus been quite well contained so far. A further 
difference is the originally higher degree of persistence in volatility measured by the 
 
models. These approaches in general identify outliers using a similar rule as we did. 
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 GARCH term (0.9389), which decreases under the float (0.8525). Under the tight regime 
the volatility of the Slovak koruna was less affected by unexpected shocks than its Czech 
counterpart, since the ARCH term is lower (0.0442). Under the float this changes. 
Unexpected shocks tend to  increase the exchange rate risk, as documented by the first-
order ARCH term coefficient (0.2390), and such an effect is dampened by more distant 
shocks as evidenced by the negative second-order ARCH term coefficient (-0.0986); this 
may likely come from purposeful adjustments of these shocks managed by the National 
Bank of Slovakia (NBS). A disturbing observation is the high sum of ARCH and GARCH 
coefficients that is not far from unity under the tight regime (0.9831) nor under the float 
(0.9928). This implies that the exchange rate risk of the Slovak koruna is converging to a 
steady state at an extremely slow rate and not decreasing. As in the Czech case, asymmetric 
shocks do not seem to affect the currency’s volatility since the TARCH term coefficients 
are insignificant under both regimes. The effect of the interest rate differential is 
insignificant under the tight regime but is significant under the float and increases by an 
order of magnitude. As before, effects of interest differential changes are not found 
(coefficient not reported). 
Figure 2 captures the development of the volatility of the Slovak koruna. During the 
fixed exchange rate regime volatility gradually rose from the beginning of 1997. This date 
coincides with an increase in the fluctuation band to ± 7.5% and with the start of excessive 
budgetary spending by the government. The Russian financial crisis in May 1997 coupled 
with crisis in the Czech Republic created pressure for exchange rate depreciation, but the 
central bank was able to maintain the fixed regime at the expense of a high level of interest 
rates and loss of foreign exchange reserves. This pressure on the exchange rate had 
gradually decreased towards the end of 1997. During the course of 1998, mounting 
government deficits (around 6% of GDP) put pressure on demand for the koruna and 
resulted in very high interest rates that enabled the NBS to support the existence of the fixed 
regime for an additional year. However, shortly before parliamentary elections (September 
1998) it became clear that abandoning the fixed regime would be inevitable. This 
expectation increased volatility and finally, a few days after election results were 
announced, the fixed exchange rate regime was replaced with a floating one. The 
burgeoning economic crisis and change in exchange rate regime increased volatility at the 
end of 1998. The new government, unfortunately, did not start the reform process as quickly 
as was expected by the financial markets. In May 1999 the government, after strong 
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 depreciation pressure, announced a series of measures that helped to stabilize the 
economy. After this date, the majority of spikes in volatility are connected either with 
political turmoil (a referendum on early elections in November 2000 and April 2004, the 
presidential election in May 1999 and April 2004, regular parliamentary elections in 
September 2002 with positive results, and political instability in June 2003) or with central 
bank intervention on the foreign exchange market. Besides these internal factors, the Slovak 
foreign exchange market is often driven by regional news or sentiment. In this case, 
problems experienced by the other Visegrad countries described above and below apply to 
Slovakia as well. 
Table 6 contains the results for Hungary. Under the fixed regime the volatility did 
not affect the development of returns (insignificant coefficient not reported). The effect of 
(log of conditional) variance in the mean equation is evident under the floating regime, 
though. Its negative coefficient (-0.0013) means that the increase in volatility contributed to 
the currency's appreciation in terms of the euro; such an effect being limited due to the 
coefficient’s size, though. The estimated conditional variance equation shows that exchange 
rate risk was not as persistent under the tight regime as it was in the Czech or Slovak cases 
since the GARCH term coefficient is below unity (0.7981). The degree of persistence 
increases somewhat under the float (0.8555), though. Unanticipated “news” or “surprises” 
about volatility that are captured by the ARCH coefficient show their tendency to increase 
exchange rate risk under the tight regime (0.3050) three times more in comparison with the 
float (0.1060). The sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients is above unity under the 
tight regime (1.1031) but declines below one under the float (0.9615). The exchange rate 
risk of the forint, therefore, has been converging to a steady state only under the float 
regime but such convergence has been very slow. Asymmetric shocks, captured by the 
TARCH term, do affect the currency’s volatility quite strongly under both regimes. The 
negative coefficients mean that asymmetric shocks tend to dampen the volatility, albeit less 
under the float (-0.1345) than under the tight regime (-0.2089). The impact of the interest 
rate differential on volatility is seen under both regimes. As in the previous case, this effect 
is small but its importance heightens dramatically under the float (0.0009) as the coefficient 
increases about eight times in comparison to the tight regime (0.00012). Again, 
intertemporal change in the interest differential does not affect exchange volatility at all 
(coefficient not reported). 
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 Figure 3 depicts the volatility path in Hungary. The effect of the two major crises 
(1997, 1998) mentioned above is clearly visible during the fixed regime period, as well as is 
the Brazilian currency devaluation and crisis in 1999. Volatility then greatly decreased after 
the basket was reduced to a peg to the euro in January 2000. With the widening of the 
fluctuation band in May 2001 volatility has risen considerably. The single year 2003 hosted 
three major events that prompted outbursts of volatility. A jump in volatility in January 
2003 is associated with an attack against the Hungarian forint (HUF) on its strong end. A 
significant jump in volatility in mid-2003 coincides with a badly coordinated devaluation of 
the central parity of the Hungarian forint on June 4, 2003 by 2.26% against the euro 
accompanied by confusing statements from the central bank and government, which 
initiated quite an amount of depreciation and elevated volatility past this step visible on the 
plot. Finally, in December 2003 an attack against the HUF on its weak end prompted the 
largest jump in volatility not only in that year but during the period of the semi-floating 
regime so far. 
Results for the Polish currency are given in Table 5 and provide evidence that 
despite numerous similarities, the path of volatility in all four countries is quite different. 
The significant coefficient of the conditional variance in the mean equation implies that 
exchange rate returns were affected by the prevalent exchange rate risk under the tight 
regime but that such an effect has not been found under the float (coefficient not reported). 
The exchange rate volatility has thus been well contained since the regime was relaxed. The 
degree of the volatility’s persistence as measured by the (sum of) the GARCH term was 
markedly lower under the tight regime (0.5061) than under the float (0.7760). Under the 
tight regime, the persistence was dampened by the first-order GARCH term (-0.1499), but 
more than outweighed by the second-order one (0.6560). Of the four countries, the 
persistence of the Polish zloty has been the lowest in general, though. Under both regimes 
the currency has been affected by unexpected shocks, though far more under the tight 
regime than under the float as can be seen from the values of the ARCH term (0.3164, 
0.1535). Such an effect is divided into two periods, where the second-order ARCH effect is 
even stronger than the first-order one, indicating a cumulative effect of the shocks and some 
degree of memory on the market. More disturbing is that the sum of the ARCH and 
GARCH coefficients increased greatly from one regime to the next. The sum’s relatively 
low value under the tight regime (0.8225) increased, but nevertheless stayed below one 
(0.9295) under the float. Thus, convergence of the zloty toward a steady state considerably 
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slowed down under the float. Asymmetric shocks also affect the currency’s volatility in a 
different way than in the case of the Hungarian forint. The TARCH term coefficient is 
positive under the tight regime (0.0134) and negative under the float (-0.1611). Thus, 
asymmetric shocks tend to increase the currency's volatility under the former regime and 
decrease it under the latter one; the dampening effect is more than ten times stronger, 
though. Also, under both regimes the effect of interest rate differential is significant and of 
almost equal magnitude. As before, the effect of interest differential change is not found 
(coefficient not reported). 
As can be seen from Figure 4, in Poland the effect of the Asian crisis (1997) was 
quite limited and the outburst of volatility did not last long; this was also empirically shown 
by Gelos and Sahay (2001). The heightened volatility in September 1998 can undoubtedly 
be attributed to the official strategy of “de-coupling” the Polish financial markets and 
institutions from the Russian crisis. The monetary authorities presented compelling 
evidence of immunity to possible contagion effects of the crisis by emphasizing the better 
institutional advancement of its financial system and the higher quality of assets held by the 
country’s financial institutions (Orlowski, 2004). During the float regime period the 
volatility spikes in July 2000 and again in summer 2001 related to uncertainties about 
parliamentary approval of the budget. If the budget proposals did not get approved, Poland 
would have to borrow additional funds in eurobond markets. Official government 
statements on these needs triggered some speculative actions against the Polish zloty with 
increased volatility as a consequence. More recently in early 2005, the spike had a different 
nature as it was related to the zloty’s appreciation. This shows up because the conditional 
variance equation contains interest rate differentials as regressors. The NBP had been 
slowly cutting the interest rates in 2005, while the zloty appreciated significantly in euro 
(and USD) terms. This was particularly due to the Ministry of Finance's extensive selling of 
the proceeds from eurobonds on foreign exchange markets in exchange for domestic 
currency.28
 
6.2 Volatility patterns 
To summarize, volatility in the exchange rates of the Visegrad Four countries followed very 
different patterns; this result challenges the common conception that views the four 
28 We thank Lucjan Orlowski for sharing his insights with us. 
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countries as a rather homogenous group. This finding is further corroborated by the 
correlations for exchange rate volatility presented in Table 8. Correlation coefficients are 
calculated over the common sample for all currencies under specific exchange rate regimes. 
The length of the sample is 160 and 958 observations for fixed and floating regimes, 
respectively. The correlation is very low and further decreases under the float. Frequently 
coefficients are negative. Some co-movements in volatility, albeit low, can be traced for 
pairs of the Czech and Slovak korunas and Polish zloty-Slovak koruna. This supplementary 
evidence means that exchange rate volatility has been driven chiefly by country specific 
factors rather than common causes. 
Volatility increased or remained about the same after the tight regimes were 
replaced with more flexible ones. These findings are broadly in line with the stylized fact 
that volatility is greater under a float than under a fix. When considering that all four 
countries under study practiced inflation targeting during the flexible regime period, this 
result is also in line with the theoretical outcome of Leitemo (2004), who argued that such 
targeting would lead to excessive interest rate and exchange rate volatility.29 Future entry to 
the ERM II with a wide (± 15%) band should lead to lower volatility, and hence potential 
conflict with inflation targeting need not materialize.30 The crucial matter is the reference 
exchange rate of each currency to the euro at time of entry. An inappropriate reference rate 
– a rate not reflecting macroeconomic developments nor market sentiment - would induce 
pressures that would tend to increase its volatility and potentially violate ERM II 
boundaries. 
Both ARCH and GARCH terms have statistically significant coefficients under both 
types of regimes, which enable unambiguous comparisons. Coefficient α represents the 
reaction of volatility to news and surprises. During the period of flexible regimes its value 
increased in the Czech and Slovak Republics, indicating that the extent to which volatility 
was driven by surprises gained magnitude with respect to the previous period of tight 
regimes. The value of the coefficient, on the other hand, decreases in Poland and Hungary. 
 Coefficient β represents the degree of persistence in volatility. While the degree is 
quite high, it decreased in the Czech and Slovak Republics. This decrease in persistence can 
29 Leitemo (2004) studied interest rate and exchange rate dynamics as a game between monetary and fiscal 
policymakers, where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the 
appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive interest rate and exchange rate volatility. 
30 See Orlowski and Rybinski (2006) for a discussion of the implications of ERM II for Poland’s monetary 
policy framework. 
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 be considered a positive sign and can be understood as the result of lower pressure on 
exchange rate movements after the move from tighter exchange rate management. The 
persistence increased in Hungary and Poland. On the other hand its degree is at lower 
(Poland) or comparable (Hungary) levels than it is in the former two countries. 
 Coefficient ξ of the asymmetric term illustrates the reaction of volatility to different 
categories of news. A negative and significant coefficient in the case of the Hungarian forint 
shows a substantial suppressing effect of bad news (positive shocks) on this currency’s 
volatility during both regimes; the effect is somewhat smaller after the exchange regime 
was relaxed. The formerly positive coefficient in Poland indicates that the bad news 
(positive shocks) had a mild increasing impact on volatility during the tight regime period, 
while under the float this changes into a suppressing effect. In the case of the Czech and 
Slovak korunas the coefficients are insignificant under both regimes. 
The sum of the ARCH and GARCH terms’ coefficients indicates the degree of 
convergence to a steady state. The degree of convergence is uniformly slow for all four 
currencies, although certain improvements can be seen in the case of the Czech koruna and 
Hungarian forint. However, for the Hungarian forint this is not a marginal improvement 
since under the tight regime the sum was greater than one, thus indicating a divergent 
process. In Poland the exchange risk increased quite dramatically but the movement to the 
steady state is still slightly faster than in any of the remaining three countries. Truly 
disturbing is the development of the Slovak koruna, whose exchange risk under the float is 
moving from the steady state; the sum of the coefficients exceeds unity. In light of the fact 
that Slovakia entered the ERM II regime on November 27, 2005 such instability is 
troubling. We can only speculate whether the NBS was aware of the nature of the 
volatility's development prior to taking this important step towards the euro. 
Dependency of exchange volatility on interest rate differential movements shows 
that under both regimes the level of interest rate differential (δ1) affects the volatility of all 
four currencies (contemporaneous effect); the only exception is the case of the Slovak 
koruna under the fixed regime. This result is in line with the findings of Bilson (1999), as 
the high interest rate differential should be accompanied by higher exchange rate volatility 
in order to meet with the no arbitrage condition of international financial markets. Further, 
after floating was introduced, the effect of the interest rate differential increased, with the 
exception of Poland where it remained about the same. On the other hand, the intertemporal 
effect of the interest rate differential was not detected for any currency under either regime. 
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7. Conclusions 
We analyze the volatility of exchange rates in the Visegrad Four countries: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. We compare volatilities in the currencies under 
specific exchange rate regimes, and use an augmented path-dependent threshold GARCH 
specification (TGARCH-M) to evaluate the dependency of exchange rate on its volatility 
and to uncover the effects of external shocks and interest rates on exchange rate volatility, 
as well as its persistence and tendency towards a steady state. 
Our findings show that daily returns on the Czech and Polish currencies depended 
on the prevalent exchange rate risk under the tight regime, while the Hungarian currency is 
affected by its volatility under the float; there is no evidence for Slovakia. Such findings 
imply that exchange rate risk has not been well contained in the past, but that only the 
Hungarian currency is affected under the current regime. It should be noted that in all three 
cases volatility contributes to the appreciation of the currency, which is usually considered 
not that harmful when compared with depreciation pressures. 
Results from estimated conditional volatility show that after a major switch in 
exchange regime has taken place, volatility tends to increase. This finding is generally in 
line with the stylized fact that exchange volatility is greater under a flexible regime than 
under a tight one. Further, the result of external shocks, news or surprises, on exchange 
volatility is not uniform and differs across countries; volatility has been driven primarily by 
country specific reasons. The extent to which the volatility was driven by shocks increased 
under the float for the Czech and Slovak currencies, while it decreased for the Hungarian 
and Polish ones. In this respect the central banks of Poland and Hungary are in a better 
position since their currencies are better able to contain external shocks, possibly due to 
more developed financial markets. The opposite is true for volatility persistence: it 
decreased in the case of the former countries (korunas) and decreased for the latter ones 
(zloty and forint). A decrease in persistence can be considered a positive sign. On the other 
hand, the persistence has been at roughly the same level for all four currencies under the 
float, and in this respect none of them is “better” than any other. The asymmetric effect of 
past shocks yields mixed results under the tight regime, but its uniformly suppressing role is 
documented under the float.31
31 This evidence is available for Hungary and Poland; other coefficients are insignificant. 
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 Two results merit specific attention. First, the contemporaneous effects of interest 
rate differentials (on exchange rate volatility) are small, but clearly present, and increase 
under the float. The effects of changes in interest differentials do not materialize, though. 
This result makes sense for several reasons. During the period of tighter regimes, transition 
countries largely did not conduct an independent monetary policy. But after abandoning 
tighter regimes, the monetary policies of these countries became more independent and the 
interest rate became its key instrument. Further, the level of interest rates for the Visegrad 
countries was relatively high during the tighter regime period. A high interest rate should, 
ceteris paribus, cause appreciation of the currency (within the bands of the currency basket 
and crawling pegs). However, in the case that a high nominal interest rate reflects a high 
expected inflation rate (as was the case), the currency is expected to lose value in the future 
(Frankel, 1993). Therefore, if the level of the interest rate (or its differential) mirrors the 
uncertain economic situation of the country proxied by the presence of high inflation, there 
should materialize the effect of interest rate enhancing exchange rate volatility, which is in 
fact what we found. 
Second, convergence of exchange rate volatility to the steady state is the least 
straightforward outcome. When the two regimes are compared, convergence rate increased 
as well as decreased, depending on the currency. Altogether, it has been relatively slow and 
at about equal footing for three currencies. The exception is the Slovak koruna, whose 
volatility tends to diverge from the steady state. All four countries should strive to limit 
their currencies’ volatility by enhancing institutions critical to functioning financial markets 
as well as to remedy weaknesses discussed earlier as sources of volatility. Since Slovakia 
has already entered the ERM II stage, it should lead the pack, but its diverging trend seems 
to be a serious drawback. 
In general, results from both methods lead to the conclusion that the width of the 
fluctuation band, either narrow or broad, does not necessarily mean an unambiguous 
influence on exchange rate fluctuation. There can be various factors that affect the volatility 
of exchange rate other than the type of exchange rate regime. However, the type of regime 
is likely the strongest factor as is the role interest rate plays in exchange rate volatility. 
Our findings show that policy makers should work to contain exchange rate 
volatility. One good reason is related to the large openness of the Visegrad economies and 
their dependency on foreign trade. Higher volatility under the float might have negative 
effects on international trade; these effects were documented by Égert and Morales-
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 Zumaquero (2005) for the past. Increased foreign exchange volatility may also dampen the 
pass-through from exchange rate to inflation, which may have a potentially negative impact 
on the ongoing process of convergence in prices to EU15 levels. Specifically, increased 
volatility associated with a more flexible exchange rate regime, together with the inflation 
targeting framework, may break the link between exchange rate and prices by disconnecting 
primarily non-tradable goods from the exchange rate (Coricelli, Jazbec, and Masten, 2006). 
Further, when we connect spikes of volatility with real events it is evident that 
volatility is not a completely exogenous process. Budgetary imbalances are probably the 
most critical issue in the Visegrad Four countries that affect not only exchange rate 
volatility but the entire process of conversion to the EMU (see Kočenda, Kutan, and Yigit, 
2005, for a thorough assessment), and government deficits are in the hands of policymakers. 
In any event, the uncertain position of fiscal discipline works as a common exogenous 
factor behind exchange rate volatility. Further, central banks should set low inflation 
targets, gain their credibility, and stabilize nominal interest rates at low levels. A stable 
interest rate propagates less volatility in exchange rate, and achieving stable low inflation 
promotes a less volatile exchange rate as well, which is in accord with Orlowski (2004). 
This, however, constitutes a risk of expectations for a nominal exchange rate appreciation 
trend which may paradoxically strengthen exchange volatility. To avoid such a convergence 
game it is imperative to create a consistent framework for monetary policy decisions. Even 
more importantly, central banks should enhance communication of their policy decisions 
and targets to the markets (Woodford, 2005). Such an approach should reduce the frequency 
of unexpected news as well as surprises with respect to monetary policy steps and 
instruments. Hence, it would reduce those major factors that have driven exchange volatility 
in the Visegrad countries. From the two major areas above it follows that coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policies might help to reduce exchange volatility the most. In the 
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 Table 1 
Exchange Rate Regime Development 
 
 
A: Czech Republic 
Changes to koruna exchange regime 
 
1 January 1991 Currency basket peg regime, Basket: 45.52% DEM, 31.34% USD, 
12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP, 6.55% CHF 
2 January 1992 Change in Basket composition: 36.15% DEM, 49.07% USD, 
8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF 
8 February 1993 Split of Czechoslovak currency – Czech koruna. No change in 
basket composition or band width 
3 May 1993 Basket 65% DEM, 35% USD, Band ±0.5% 
28 February 1996 Widening band to ±7.5% 





Changes to zloty exchange regime 
 
1 January 1990 Exchange rate fixed to dollar. 1USD=9500 ZLP 
16 May 1991 Exchange rate fixed to a currency basket (45% USD, 35% DEM, 
10%GBP, 5% FRF, 5% CHF), devaluation to 1USD=11100ZLP 
(16.84%) 
14 October 1991 Crawling peg to the currency basket: crawling rate 1.8% monthly, 
NBP margin +/- 0.6% 
26 February 1992 Devaluation by 12% + maintain crawling peg 1.8% 
27 August 1993 Devaluation by 7.4% + Crawling rate 1.6% 
13 September 1994 Crawling peg 1.5 % monthly 
30 November 1994 Crawling peg 1.4% 
16 February 1995 Crawling peg 1.2 % 
6 March 1995 NBP margin +/- 2% 
16 May 1995 Introduction of crawling band +/-7%, crawling rate 1.2%, 
interbank rates subject to free market forces and NBP 
intervention 
22 December 1995 Revaluation by 6% 
8 January 1996 Crawling peg 1.0% 
26 February 1998 Crawling peg 0.8% and band +/- 10% 
17 July 1998 Crawling peg 0.65% 
10 September 1998 Crawling peg 0.5% 
28 October 1998 Band +/- 12.5% 
1 January 1999 Change in currency basket: euro 55%, dollar 45% 
25 March 1999 Crawling peg 0.3%, band +/- 15% 
7 June 1999 NBP is not obliged to perform transactions with commercial 
banks during fixing 






Changes in basket and width of the forint intervention band 
26 February 1990 USD 42,6%, DEM 25,6%, ATS 10,4%, CHF 4,9 %, ITL 3,8%, 
FRF 3,5 %, GBP 2,9%, SEK 2,0%, NLG 1,7%, FIM 1,5%, BEC 
1,1% 
14 March 1991 USD 50,9%, DEM 23,1%, ATS 8,1%, CHF 3,9%, ITL 3,5%, FRF 
3,6%, GBP 2,7 %, SEK 1,5%, NLG 2,7% 
9 December 1991 USD 50% , ECU 50% 
1 July 1992 Band width ± 0.3% 
2 August 1993 USD 50% , DEM 50% 
16 May 1994 USD 30% , ECU 70% 
1 June 1994 Band width ± 0.5% 
5 August 1994 Band width ± 1.25% 
22 December 1994 Band width ± 2.25% 
1 January 1997 USD 30% , DEM 70% 
1 January 1999 USD 30% , EUR 70% 
1 January 2000 EUR 100% 
4 May 2001 Band width ± 15.00% 
 
Official devaluations of forint 
31 January 1990  1.0%  29 November 1994 1.0% 
6 February 1990  2.0%   3 January 1995  1.4% 
20 February 1990 2.0%   14 February 1995 2.0% 
7 January 1991  15.0%   13 March 1995  9.0% 
8 November 1991  5.8%   16 March 1995 1.9% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.060%) 
16 March 1992 1.9%   29 June 1995 1.3% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.042%) 
24 June 1992 1.6%   2 January 1996 1.2% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.040%) 
9 November 1992 1.9%   1 January 1997 1.2% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.040%) 
12 February 1993  1.9%   1 April 1997 1.1% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.036%) 
26 March 1993 2 .9%   15 August 1997 1.0% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.033%) 
7 June 1993  1.9%   1 January 1998 0.9% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.030%) 
9 July 1993 3.0%   15 June 1998  0.8% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.026%) 
29 September 1993 4.5%   1 October 1998 0.7% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.023%) 
3 January 1994  1.0%   1 January 1999  0.6% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.020%) 




13 May 1994 1.0%   1 October 1999 0.4% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.0133%) 
10 June 1994  1.2%   1 April 2000 0.3% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.0098%) 
5 August 1994  8.0%   1 April 2001 0.2% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.00654%) 
11 October 1994  1.1%   1 October 2001 No devaluation 





Changes to koruna exchange regime 
 
1 January 1991 Currency basket peg regime, Basket: 45.52% DEM, 31.34% USD, 
12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP, 6.55% CHF 
2 January 1992 Change in Basket composition: 36.15% DEM, 49.07% USD, 
8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF 
8 February- 1993 Split of Czechoslovak currency – Slovak koruna, Basket: 36.16% 
DEM, 49.06% USD, 8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF, Band 
±1.5% 
10 July 1993 Devaluation 10% 
14 July 1994 Basket changed: 60% DEM, 40% USD  
1 January 1996 Band ±3% 
31 July 1996 Band ±5% 
1 January 1997 Band ±7% 
2 October 1998 Introduction of managed float 












koruna Slovak koruna Polish zloty
Hungarian 
forint
No. of Obs. 1048 779 553 1136 1922 1594 1538 958
Mean 1,15E-05 -3,53E-05 1,99E-04 2,64E-04 -1,04E-04 -5,41E-05 -5,03E-05 1,34E-05
Std. Deviation 0,0029 0,0034 0,0063 0,0024 0,0044 0,0030 0,0072 0,0057
Minimum -0,0130 -0,0384 -0,0327 -0,0143 -0,0269 -0,0155 -0,0582 -0,0246
Maximum 0,0207 0,0157 0,0463 0,0164 0,0311 0,0248 0,0630 0,0691
Start 05.01.1993 07.07.1995 12.08.1996 01.08.1996 01.07.1997 01.12.1998 02.02.1999 02.07.2001










koruna Slovak koruna Polish zloty
Hungarian 
forint
No. of Obs. 1048 779 553 1136 1922 1594 1538 958
Mean 11,1% 16,7% 22,4% 16,7% 6,1% 8,0% 11,3% 9,6%
Std. Deviation 2,3% 8,1% 2,6% 4,1% 4,5% 3,6% 5,2% 1,9%
Minimum 6,2% 5,1% 16,1% 9,3% 1,8% 2,2% 5,2% 4,2%
Maximum 20,0% 62,5% 27,3% 23,9% 22,7% 30,0% 21,8% 15,2%
Start 05.01.1993 07.07.1995 12.08.1996 01.08.1996 01.07.1997 01.12.1998 02.02.1999 02.07.2001
End 29.04.1997 28.09.1998 30.12.1998 27.04.2001 28.06.2005 28.06.2005 28.06.2005 28.06.2005
Basic Statistics: Daily returns of local currency with respect to the Euro
Table 2.1
Fixed exchange rate regime Floating exchange rate regime
Table 2.2
Basic Statistics: One-month interest rate on local currency





Czech koruna 1048 >5*SD 4 0 4
Slovak koruna 779 >5*SD 2 1 3
Polish zloty 553 >5*SD 3 2 5
Hungarian forint 1136 >5*SD 3 1 4
Czech koruna 1922 >5*SD 2 4 6
Slovak koruna 1593 >5*SD 3 1 4
Polish zloty 1535 >5*SD 2 2 4
Hungarian forint 958 >2*SD 19 14 33
Table 3
Shocks to Exchange Rate Returns
Note : SD means standard deviation
Fixed exchange rate regime
Floating exchange rate regime





Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
a 0 -0,0042 0,0021 0,0448 -0,0002 0,0001 0,0041
a 1 - -
a 2 - -
a 3 - -
b -0,0003 0,0002 0,0458 -
λ 0,0167 0,0021 0,0000 0,0237 0,0014 0,0000
ω 0,0000 0,0000 0,1192 0,0000 0,0000 0,0011
α 1 0,0612 0,0190 0,0013 0,0672 0,0197 0,0007
α 2 - -
β 0,9307 0,0224 0,0000 0,8910 0,0224 0,0000
ξ -0,0274 0,0200 0,1697 0,0107 0,0229 0,6407
δ 1 0,0002 0,0001 0,0986 0,0009 0,0003 0,0064






Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
a 0 -0,0001 0,0001 0,2377 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0217
a 1 - 0,0518 0,0215 0,0158
a 2 - -
a 3 - -
b - -
λ 0,0153 0,0046 0,0009 0,0165 0,0013 0,0000
ω 0,0000 0,0000 0,2480 0,0000 0,0000 0,0058
α 1 0,0442 0,0213 0,0376 0,2390 0,0592 0,0001
α 2 - -0,0986 0,0568 0,0822
β 0,9389 0,0321 0,0000 0,8525 0,0317 0,0000
ξ -0,0063 0,0262 0,8085 -0,0532 0,0361 0,1404
δ 1 0,0000 0,0000 0,4904 0,0005 0,0003 0,0612







Fixed regime Floating regime
Fixed regime Floating regime
0.9582














Results of the TGARCH-M Volatility Estimation: Czech koruna
779 1593
0.9919







Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
a 0 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0149 0,0044 0,0007
a 1 - -
a 2 - -
a 3 - -
b - -0,0013 0,0004 0,0008
λ 0,0143 0,0014 0,0000 0,0118 0,0005 0,0000
ω 0,0000 0,0000 0,0062 0,0000 0,0000 0,0085
α 1 0,3050 0,0541 0,0000 0,1060 0,0301 0,0004
α 2 - -
β 0,7981 0,0248 0,0000 0,8555 0,0408 0,0000
ξ -0,2089 0,0593 0,0004 -0,1345 0,0375 0,0003
δ 1 0,0001 0,0000 0,0036 0,0009 0,0004 0,0410






Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  
a 0 -0,0058 0,0032 0,0752 -0,0002 0,0002 0,1344
a 1 - -0,0622 0,0239 0,0093
a 2 - -0,0806 0,0251 0,0013
a 3 - -0,0585 0,0242 0,0158
b -0,0005 0,0003 0,0795 -
λ 0,0232 0,0018 0,0000 0,0355 0,0017 0,0000
ω 0,0000 0,0000 0,9713 0,0000 0,0000 0,0004
α 1 0,1260 0,0568 0,0264 0,1535 0,0379 0,0001
α 2 0,1904 0,0563 0,0007 -
β 1 -0,1499 0,0721 0,0376 0,7760 0,0549 0,0000
β 2 0,6560 0,0756 0,0000 -
ξ 0,0134 0,0666 0,8408 -0,1611 0,0404 0,0001
δ 1 0,0016 0,0008 0,0599 0,0015 0,0007 0,0339























Fixed regime Floating regime
Note: DW means Durbin-Watson statistics, AIC and SIC stand for Akaike and Schwarz-Bayesian information criteria 
respectively
Table 6
Results of the TGARCH-M Volatility Estimation: Hungarian forint
Table 7
Results of the TGARCH-M Volatility Estimation: Polish zloty















Fixed exchange rate regime
Czech koruna 1
Slovak koruna 0,117 1
Polish zloty -0,247 0,432 1
Hungarian forint -0,313 0,030 0,488 1
Floating exchange rate regime
Czech koruna 1
Slovak koruna 0,246 1
Polish zloty 0,096 0,199 1
Hungarian forint 0,012 -0,019 -0,045 1
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated over the common 
sample for all currencies under specific exchange rate regime. The 
length of the sample is 160 and 958 observations for fixed and 
floating regimes, respectively.
Figure 2
Conditional Variance: Slovak koruna
Figure 3
Figure 1
Conditional Variance: Czech koruna
Panel A: Czech koruna - Fixed regime Panel B: Czech koruna - Floating regime
Panel A: Hungarian forint - Fixed regime Panel B: Hungarian forint - Floating regime
Panel A: Slovak koruna - Fixed regime Panel B: Slovak koruna - Floating regime
Panel A: Polish zloty - Fixed regime Panel B: Polish zloty - Floating regime
Conditional Variance: Polish zloty
Figure 4
Conditional Variance: Hungarian forint
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